International Relations, Economic and Compliance with International Law: Harnessing Common Resources to Protect the Environment and Solve Global Problems by Duruigbo, Emeka
CALIFORNIA WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 31 SPRING 2001 NUMBER 2
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ECONOMICS AND
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARNESSING
COMMON RESOURCES TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
AND SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS
EMEKA DURUIGBO*
INTRODUCTION
It is believed that States generally comply with the provisions of
international agreements to which they are parties.' But the existing state of
affairs tends to present a somewhat different picture,2 suggesting that imple-
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1. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 48-49 (2d ed.
1979). "In less dramatic contexts it is relevant that, despite the continuing temptations in daily
intercourse, unnumbered principles of customary law and thousands of treaties are regularly
observed." Id. at 48; see also HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITIcS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 271 (Hans J. Morgenthau & Kenneth W. Thompson eds.,
2d ed. 1951). "The great majority of the rules of international law are generally observed by
all nations." Id.
2. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections
on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 123 (1992). "States of-
ten seem to ignore not only their political pledges but also the treaties to which they are par-
ties." Id.; see also William Tetley, Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The
Pros, Cons, and Alternatives to International Conventions-How to Adopt an International
Convention, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 775 (2000). "The major defect of international law is not only
that nations fail to ratify conventions, protocols, and technical amendments, but also that
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mentation of and compliance with international accords are imperfect and
often inadequate? A study done in the early part of the last decade by the
United States General Accounting Office, which focused on compliance of
governments with international environmental treaties, concluded that com-
pliance is poor." More particularly, in international oil pollution cases, it has
been observed that the bane of the legal framework on ship-source oil pollu-
tion control has not been the content of the applicable law, but enforcement
of the law.' At the moment, the most rigorous effort mounted in the area of
enforcement of the provisions of marine pollution conventions is through
Port State control.6 However, regardless of whatever modest gains are made
through the Port State scheme, the problems in implementation, compliance,
and enforcement will linger for a long while, unless efforts are directed at
the core of the problem.
International scholars and observers of international affairs appear to be
united in the belief that "[w]hat is needed now is less the adoption of new
instruments than more effective implementation of existing ones."7 The
problems of implementation, compliance, and enforcement are linked to the
extant system that needs to take into consideration relevant matters that will
facilitate treaty implementation and compliance.8 This work examines mo-
when they do so, they may not conform to, and comply with, the law." Id. at 819-20.
3. See, e.g., ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS, (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, eds., 1998); see also
Jennifer L. Ulrich, Note, Confronting Gender-Based Violence with International Instruments:
Is A Solution to the Pandemic Within Reach?, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 629 (2000).
"Although countries routinely adhere to traditional international law even in the absence of a
positivist enforcement scheme, non-compliance continues to be a frequent occurrence." Id. at
637.
4. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, International Environment: International Agree-
ments Are Not Well-Monitored, GAO/RCED 92-43 (1992).
5. See Mark W. Wallace, "Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas": The Report of the Donaldson In-
quiry into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping, 1995 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM.
L.Q. 404. The Donaldson Inquiry into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping,
constituted by the Government of the United Kingdom, in its report "was of the opinion that
the measures currently in force would greatly reduce marine pollution if correctly imple-
mented." Id. at 406-07.
6. See generally Ted L. McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Is-
sues of International Law, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 207 (2000). See also Secretary General
of the International Maritime Organization William A. O'Neill, Address at the Hong Kong
Shipowners Association Luncheon (Mar. 27, 2000), reprinted at http://www.imo.org/
imo/speech-1/hongkong.htm. Looking at the rationale for introducing the new regime on port
state control and explaining its importance, O'Neill stated: "IMO has encouraged the devel-
opment of regional port State control systems as a means of ensuring that ships do in fact
comply with the internationally agreed upon rules." Id.
7. Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 123.
8. Steven M. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions to Improve Global Envi-
ronmental Relations, Agreement, and Treaty Enforcement, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L.
REv. 771 (1995) [hereinafter Anderson, Reforming International Institutions]. "Today the
great problems burdening international environmental law and its institutions revolve around
deficiencies relating to ratification, implementation, coordination, enforcement, and monitor-
ing of [international] agreements." Id. at 772.
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dalities for improving the effectiveness of international agreements relating
to marine environmental protection and intentional oil pollution by ships.
This encompasses not only how parties to the treaties can, and could be
made to, work toward improved compliance, but also considers ways of en-
hancing States' assent to these treaties.
This article's objectives will be realized by drawing from the ideas of
scholars in other disciplines, notably international relations and economics.
The purpose of considering international relations is to examine the impact
of national interest on international behavior. Discussions on international
relations will, however, be restricted to the postulates of the realist school
and regime theory. While the realist school contends that the self-interest of
nation-states propel their behavior in the international arena, regime theory
argues that there are certain structures in the international system which play
a key role in how states conduct their international affairs. Thereafter, some
of the economic issues raised by international oil trade and shipping will be
discussed. This will lay the foundation for the argument in favor of capacity
building for developing countries. This entails empowering and equipping
developing countries with the needed resources, which would facilitate
bringing them into compliance with, and helping them participate in the im-
plementation of, international law. The discussion seeks to show that inter-
national oil pollution control will possess a brighter position if the position
of developing countries, as well as the incorporation of their interests in pol-
icy formulation in this area, are taken into consideration.
This work is divided into two major parts. Part I examines international
relations theories, especially in relation to ship-source oil pollution control.
Part II involves a discussion of the economic dimension of treaty implemen-
tation. In particular, the relevance of a fee paying arrangement for use of
oceans will be examined, basically as a source of revenue for the execution
of projects connected to the preservation and protection of the marine envi-
ronment. There will also be an exploration of ideas for an international fi-
nancial mechanism as an appropriate means of influencing States' behavior
in this area. The Global Environment Facility, currently being administered
by three international institutions, will be discussed.9 Thereafter, general
conclusions will be drawn, essentially suggesting that an effective way of
securing the crucial co-operation of developing countries in the maritime oil
pollution crusade is the introduction of a measure of economic motivation
for such co-operative ventures. It should be noted that while this discussion
is carried on in the context of marine oil pollution, the ideas expressed in this
work can go beyond this focal area and can be replicated in, and applied to,
virtually any aspect of international law.
9. The institutions that constitute the tripartite institutional arrangement of the Global
Environment Facility are the World Bank, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). David Reed, The Global Envi-
ronment Facility and Non-Governmental Organizations, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191,
193 (1993).
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I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A. Realism
Realism, which developed after the second World War,"0 thrives on a
"rational-actor conception of compliance" premised on a Machiavellian per-
spective:" "A wise ruler, therefore, cannot and should not keep his word
when such an observance of faith would be to his disadvantage and when the
reasons which made him promise are removed."'" The realist's position,
therefore, is that States will only keep their bargains when it is in their own
individual interest. 3 Thus, "[riegardless of their domestic colors, states in the
international realm [are] champions only of their own national interest.""
A major contention of the realist school of thought is that the interna-
tional sphere is "anarchic" and that, combined with "the pursuit and use of
power... are the primary determinants of international behavior."' 5 Under
this proposition, international law does not influence States' behavior but if
it does at all, the influence is infinitesimal. "[C]onsiderations of power rather
than of law determine compliance" in every significant area. 6 Power, of
course, is a manifestation of self-interest.'7 International rules embodied in
treaties serve essentially as instruments in the hands of powerful states to ac-
complish their objective. Identifying one of the major conclusions of this in-
strumentalist view, political science professor Robert 0. Keohane writes:
"States use the rules of international law as instruments to attain their inter-
10. See RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 28 (Nazli Choucri ed., 1994).
11. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) [hereinafter CHAYES
& CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY].
12. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 58-59 (Peter Bondanella ed., Peter Bondanella
& Mark Musa trans., Oxford Univ., Press 1984) (1532); see also Abram Chayes & Antonia
Handler Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Trea-
ties, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 311 (1991) [hereinafter Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without En-
forcement]. "The still-prevailing realist assumption is that a nation will honor its treaties only
so long as they are convenient and, if it has the power, will disregard them when they no
longer serve immediate needs." Id. at 312.
13. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 535 (citing Sir Winston Churchill's speech to the
British House of Commons on the likelihood of a war with the Soviet Union on Jan. 23,
1948).
14. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations The-
ory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 207 (1993).
15. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 28.
16. MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 272.
17. Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules-Customary International
Law From an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109 (1995) [hereinafter
Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules]. "[S]tates act in largely self-interested ways,
and that one, if not the primary, way in which they promote their self-interest is the applica-
tion of power." Id. at 112-13 (citation omitted).
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ests."'' Treaty making therefore affords a good opportunity for states to pro-
mote their own national interests to evade legal obligations that might be
harmful to them.19
A look at a possible scenario in the maritime oil pollution area appears
to lend credence to the realist theories, both in the negotiation of treaties and
in compliance with treaty provisions. One writer makes the following obser-
vation:
A government, recognizing its interest in avoiding oil pollution of the sea,
may desire a rule prohibiting it and may believe it to be in its interest to
have general compliance with the rule. On the other hand, the same gov-
ernment might permit its ships, when on the far side of the globe, to flush
their tanks in violation of the rule when it would save money to do so. The
kind of direct self-interest here being considered would tend to cause
compliance with the antipollution rule only when a country's ship was an-
chored off its own public beaches.20
The realist position, however, does not accurately describe reality. It is un-
likely that a State would conduct its international affairs solely on short-
sighted self-interest. Such an attitude would cost the State a loss of reputa-
tion and honor, which are vital in international affairs. Other States would
find it increasingly difficult to enter into bargains, bilaterally or multilater-
ally, with a State that routinely disregards the principle pacta sunt servanda,
which states that States are bound to keep promises they make, in order to
protect its short term interests.2 1 Whatever a State had gained by such an ap-
proach to international relations might eventually turn into a loss in the long
run, thus amounting to a pyrrhic victory.
Furthermore, the realist assertion that national interest is the ultimate
motivator and that international law does not play any significant role in in-
fluencing state behavior may not represent an accurate depiction of the dy-
namics of the international arrangement. Opponents argue that there are
some fundamental, structural principles of international law, which tend to
constrain or qualify the self-interested application of power by States.23
A State's self-interest may propel it to act in a certain manner. At the
same time, its ultimate action is usually taken after considering the probable
18. Robert Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38
HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 488 (1997).
19. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 262-64.
20. ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (1981).
21. Pacta sunt servanda is considered a fundamental principle of international law. See
Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 185 (1993).
The principle is incorporated in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331.
22. "As with Pyrrhus (who is supposed to have said: 'One more such victory over the
Romans, and we are utterly undone'), the costs incurred in gaining a desired decision will in
some instances outweigh any benefits to be derived from that decision." FISHER, supra note
20.
23. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 179.
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chain of events that such a move may trigger within the international com-
munity. Thus, under the principle of reciprocity, a State would only act if
willing to accord other States the right to act in a similar manner. On the
other hand, a State might refrain from a particular course of action, expect-
ing that in the future other States will reciprocate."' The principle of
reciprocity, albeit a general concept in social relations, "also finds
expression in a structural principle of international law, whereby in the
context of general customary international law any state claiming a right
under that law has to accord all other States the same right."25
Contrary to realist theories, therefore, the principle of reciprocity in so-
cial relations and international law discussed above seems to influence State
behavior, notwithstanding the state's self-interest and position of power. A
clear illustration of this idea in customary international law is the Truman
Proclamation in the 1940s on the Continental Shelf.26 In 1945, "the United
States proclaimed its continental shelf, which in the case of the eastern sea-
board extended to as far as 250 [nautical miles], exclusive for its exploration
and exploitation and subject to its jurisdiction and control."27 By so pro-
claiming, the United States placed itself in a position in which it was also
bound to recognize the rights of other states to avail themselves of the same
rule.28 In essence, a "[S]tate will therefore only behave in support of an exist-
ing, emerging, or potential customary rule if it is prepared to accept the gen-
eralization of that rule."'29
This scenario is not restricted to customary international law; it is also
evident in treaties. When States enter into treaties, it suggests they believe
they are accepting significant constraints to their freedom to act in the future
and they intend to comply with those constraints over a broad range of cir-
cumstances.' This explains why treaty negotiation and assent is not handled
lightly by States nor is the responsibility assigned to junior officials of the
State.31
24. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 3 (Stephen D. Krasner ed. 1983).
25. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 162 (emphasis
added).
26. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Re-
sources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945), 3
C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948), reprinted in 40 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 45 (1946); see also Byers, Cus-
tom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 162.
27. Mafaniso Hara, Southern African Marine Exclusive Zones: Burdens and Opportuni-
ties, Monograph No. 9, DIPLOMATS AND DEFENDERS (Feb. 1997), available at
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/NO%209/Hara.html.
28. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 162.
29. Id. at 162-63.
30. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 311.
31. See, e.g., GEORGE C. KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION:
EVOLUTION OF PORT STATE REGImE 151 (1993) [hereinafter KASOULIDES, PORT STATE
CONTROL].
The [particular form of] designation of the Paris MOU ... and the fact that it was
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International law not only constrains State behavior, it also influences
positive action by States. Ship-source oil pollution control presents a clear
refutation of the mainstream realist contention that treaty rules do not induce
compliance.32 At the Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention Conference in
1978 (TSPP),33 discussions on segregated ballast tanks (SBTs) initially intro-
duced in the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL) resurfaced. 35 During the Conference, the United
States proposed that new and existing tankers weighing in excess of 20,000
tons should be built with SBTs, contrary to the prevailing position that only
applied to tankers weighing in excess of 70,000 tons, but "[m]ost States saw
SBT as hugely expensive [and instead] proposed crude oil washing (COW)
as an environmentally equivalent but cheaper alternative." '36 A compromise
arrangement emerged in which new tankers weighing over 20,000 tons were
required to install both SBT and COW, while existing tankers weighing over
40,000 tons had the option of installing either SBT or COW."
Data from a study on tanker fleets world wide at the end of 1991 show
that compliance with the above-mentioned equipment requirements had been
concluded among maritime authorities and not states indicates the willingness of
the co-operating states to participate in a harmonized system of PSC [(Port State
Control)] and exchange information but not to enter into new contractual and bind-
ing obligations.
Id. This revealed that European member countries of the 1982 Paris Memorandum on Port
State Control did not intend it to be binding on them. See generally Memorandum of Under-
standing on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on Maritime Safety and Protec-
tions of the Marine Environment, Jan. 26, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Paris Port State Con-
trol MOU].
32. See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 28. "[R]ealism encourages a bias against assuming
that treaties cause behavior to change, and provides an essential set of alternative explanations
of why nations might take actions that conform to treaty provisions." Id.
33. The slow pace of ratification of the 1973 Convention Marine Pollution Convention
incited correction through this convention. See generally Sonia Z. Pritchard, Load on Top-
From the Sublime to the Absurd, 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 185 (1978). See also Jeff B. Curtis,
Comment, Vessel-Source Oil Pollution and MARPOL 73/78: An International Success Story?,
15 ENVTL. L. 679 (1985), David Ashley Bagwell, Products Liability in Admiralty: Hazardous
and Noxious Substances, 62 TUL. L. REv. 433, 462 (1988).
34. International Conference on Marine Pollution: International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL].
35. See generally R. MICHAEL M'GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TANKERS AT SEA 107-142 (Ernst B. Haas & John Gerard Ruggie
eds., 1979).
36. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 259 (footnote omitted).
37. Inter-Governmental Maritime Organization, Protocol of 1978 Relating to the Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Annex 1, Reg. 13, I.M.C.O.
Doc. TSPP/CONF/1 1 (Feb. 16, 1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 546. It replaced the existing An-
nex 1, Reg. 13 in the 1973 Convention. MARPOL, supra note 34. The International Maritime
Organization replaced IMCO on Mar. 6, 1948. See infra, note 99. "New tankers" means an oil
tanker "for which the building contract is [drawn up] after 1 June 1979... or, in the absence
of a building contract, the keel of which is laid.., after 1 January 1980... or the delivery of
which is after 1 June 1982." Id., Annex 1, Reg. 1, 1 26. Both conventions are jointly referred
to as MARPOL 73/78.
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impressive.38 "[Approximately] 94 percent of tankers built in 1979 or earlier
[had] installed SBT or COW, 98 percent of those built between 1980 and
1982 [had] installed SBT, and 98 percent of those built after June 1982 [had]
installed both."39 This nearly universal adoption has been linked to the influ-
ence of MARPOL. "The evidence presented unequivocally demonstrates
that governments and private corporations have undertaken a variety of ac-
tions involving compliance, monitoring, and enforcement that they would
not have taken in the absence of relevant treaty provisions.
''
The levels of compliance were achieved notwithstanding the fact that
the SBT requirement imposed huge expenses on tanker owners and was of
no economic benefit to them.4' Moreover, it happened at a period of decreas-
ing oil prices which increased pressures to cut costs.'2 The fact that "the ma-
jority of tankers exempt from the equipment requirement have not installed
SBT... affirm[s] the conclusion that the installations represented treaty-
induced compliance. 43 It is also remarkable that, "[a]lthough many tankers
were registered in states that [initially] opposed the adoption of the SBT re-
quirements and had strong incentives not to comply, all [states] required to
comply did so."'
The realist theory, therefore, fails to adequately explain States' behav-
ior. It may be pointed out, however, that when regarding assent to a treaty,
the realist theory may well prove valuable. Thus, while States may realize
the value of reputation and recognize the "normativity" of international law
and conduct themselves accordingly, a State is unlikely to assume obliga-
tions under a treaty when it will be inimical to its interests. That apparently
explains, for instance, the present position of the 1986 United Nations Con-
vention on Conditions for Registration of Ships.'5 The Convention occurred
in response to the practice of "flags of convenience" shipping, by which
some States allow substandard and inadequately manned ships to put to sea,
thus endangering the marine environment.46 Over ten years after its conclu-
sion, no major maritime power or flags-of-convenience State has become a
party to it, creating the impression that the treaty negatively impacts their in-
terests.
Further, although short-term interest may not dictate a State's general
conduct in international circles, a State may resort to short-term interest
38. See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 269-70.
39. Id. at 269.
40. Id. at 299.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 299-300.
45. United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, 26
I.L.M. 1229 (1987).
46. See S.G. Sturmey, The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of
Ships, 1987 LLoYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 97.
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where it is impossible to act otherwise. While a State may lose face for re-
neging on its obligations, it is a well-known fact that a State may be in non-
compliance by reason of its incapacity' to abide by its treaty obligations." In
such a case, the issue of reputation does not arise and, even if it does, a State
will certainly express a preference for self-preservation at the expense of
reputation. It stands to reason, therefore, that developing states, by reason of
their sagging economies, may be comfortable with non-compliance with in-
ternational oil pollution agreements."
B. Regime Theory
Regime theoretic analysis proceeds from an apparent realization that
there are "difficulties involved in attempting to explain all relations among
states solely on the basis of relative power and short-term calculations of
self-interest."'5 A re-evaluation of realist thinking became inevitable when
some of its basic assumptions started faltering.5 Accordingly, while realists
had argued that international institutions had no life of their own but existed
only as a corollary of dominant United States power, this argument could not
be sustained in an era that marked the relative strength of institutions like the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),52 which was replaced by
the World Trade Organization53 and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), s" at a period of perceived decline of American hegemony.5 As a con-
sequence, the impossible task before realists was to either deny that Ameri-
can power was declining or assert that those institutions "were suddenly tot-
tering."56
47. See discussion infra Part II.A.
48. Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical
Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS
160, 183 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) [hereinafter Young, The Ef-
fectiveness of International Institutions]. The writer opines that lack of capacity inhibits or
restricts abidance to treaty provisions, especially for developing countries. See id.
49. See id.
50. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 129.
51. See id. at 218.
52. General Trade Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187.
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uru-
guay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, substantially reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994), reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Joseph F. Dennin ed. 1996). The WTO embodies and
expands upon the rules of GATT. See Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements
and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 842 (1996).
54. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, amended May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, 726 U.N.T.S. 266, amended
Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, amended June 28, 1990, 31 I.L.M. 1307, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited April 15, 2001).
55. See Burley, supra note 14, at 218.
56. Id.
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In international relations, consequently, a new line of thinking or a re-
formulated theory was born as a child of necessity' and centers around re-
gimes, which are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a
given area of international relations."58
Central to the regime theory is the fact that the international system is
structured in such a way that it creates certain "principles, explicit and im-
plicit norms, and written and unwritten rules," which actors in international
relations hold in reverence and recognize as governing their behavior. 9
Viewed from that perspective, regimes both constrain and regulate the be-
havior of States.'
Regimes are also believed to "enhance compliance with international
agreements in a variety of ways, [including] reducing incentives to cheat and
enhancing the value of reputation."'" Discussing the value and raison d'etre
of regimes, Keohane asserts:
They enhance the likelihood of cooperation by reducing the costs of mak-
ing transactions that are consistent with the principles of the regime. They
create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations, legitimate and
delegitimate different types of [S]tate action, and facilitate linkages among
issues within regimes and between regimes. They increase the symmetry
and improve the quality of the information that governments receive. By
clustering issues together in the same forums over a long period of time,
they help to bring governments into continuing interaction with one an-
other, reducing incentives to cheat and enhancing the value of reputation.
By establishing legitimate standards of behavior for states to follow and
by providing ways to monitor compliance, they create the basis for decen-
tralized enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity.62
Regime theory appears fascinating and interesting, but it has not es-
caped criticism. Critics comment that regimes are merely a formula for ob-
fuscating and obscuring the power relationships that are, in their assumption,
not only the ultimate, but also the proximate, cause of behavior in the inter-
national sphere.63 According to Susan Strange, an international relations
scholar, "[a]ll those international arrangements dignified by the label regime
are only too easily upset when either the balance of bargaining power or the
57. See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DiscoRD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 245 (1984) [hereinafter KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]. "Real-
ism should not be discarded, since its insights are fundamental to an understanding of world
politics, but it does need to be reformulated to reflect the impact of information-providing in-
stitutions on state behavior, even when rational egoism persists." Id. at 245-46 (citation omit-
ted).
58. Krasner, supra note 24, at 2.
59. Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons From
Inductive Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 24, at 61, 86.
60. See id. at 62-63.
61. Burley, supra note 14, at 219.
62. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 57, at 244-45.
63. Krasner, supra note 24, at 7.
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perception of national interest (or both together) change among those states
who negotiate them.""
Regime theory has metamorphosed into neo-liberal institutionalism,
6 5
which is a more general rubric." Keohane perceives the scope of institutions
as larger than that of regimes and incorporates all "persistent and connected
sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain
activity, and shape expectations."' Institutions, according to Keohane, can
be divided into three groups, based on their levels of organization or formal-
ity." The first category encompasses "[flormal intergovernmental or cross-
national nongovernmental organizations" while the second group contains
"international regimes" defined as "institutions with explicit rules, agreed
upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international
relations."'69 The third class incorporates "conventions" defined as "informal
institutions, with implicit rules and understandings, that shape the expecta-
tions of actors. 70
To some scholars, it is an incontrovertible fact that institutions influence
States' behavior, even independent of power calculations and self-interest.
Scholars state that institutions play an important role in enhancing compli-
ance, arguing that while members of the international system enjoy a latitude
in making choices concerning compliance, the actions of institutions such as
the United Nations certainly contribute to the choices they make with regard
to compliance. 71 A perplexing question, however, has centered on whether
this should be taken as an article of faith or demonstrated empirically. 72 As
noted previously, ship design and construction standards represent one area
in which it has been empirically and analytically shown that institutions in-
duce or enhance compliance with international law. 7' Regime theory in par-
64. Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in THE POLIncs
OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 41, 48 (Paul F. Diehl ed. 1997).
65. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 132.
66. See Burley, supra note 14, at 206.
67. Robert Keohane, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
STATE POWER 1, 3 (1989).
68. Id. at 3-4.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id,
71. Oran Young, Compliance in the International System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 99, 106 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985).
72. Oran Young states:
[t]he ultimate justification for devoting substantial time and energy to the study of
regimes must be the proposition that we can account for a good deal of the vari-
ance in collective outcomes at the international level in terms of the impact of in-
stitutional arrangements. For the most part, however, this proposition is relegated
to the realm of assumptions rather than brought to the forefront as a focus for ana-
lytical and empirical investigation.
ORAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 206-07 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1989).
73. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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ticular, and institutionalism in general, therefore, appear to represent more
clearly what occurs in international politics, and seems to be steps ahead of
the realist school of thought.
It is pertinent to point out, however, that both theories tend to share
some common ground when it comes to the notion of self-interest. To some
institutionalists, self-interest is pivotal to the existence of regimes.74 States
are believed to build those structures essentially as a means of protecting
their interests." This is elaborately conveyed by political science scholar Ar-
thur A. Stein, who posits "that the same forces of autonomously calculated
self-interest that lie at the root of the anarchic international system also lay
the foundation for international regimes as a form of international order." '76
Accordingly, "there are times when rational self-interested calculation leads
actors to abandon independent decision making in favor of joint decision
making.""
To these institutionalists, both self-interest and institutions are compati-
ble and jointly influence international behavior. This is one of its major
points of divergence with the realist school because, unlike the latter theory
which harbors a disdain for international law and "[challenges international
lawyers] to establish the 'relevance' of international law," institutionalism
shares some similarities with international law in that it recognizes the place
of principles and rules in shaping behavior.79 Indeed, one writer was
prompted to observe that "[t]he similarities between institutionalism and in-
ternational law are apparent.
8S
Close inspection of one institutional arrangement utilized in oil pollu-
tion control matters (namely, reporting requirements) clearly demonstrates
the role of such arrangements in influencing States' conduct and the place of
self-interest in the whole scheme. The reporting requirement has been seen
as one way of improving treaty effectiveness and at the beginning of the past
decade, the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment foresight-
edly suggested that the problem of non-compliance should be addressed
74. Krasner, supra note 24, at 11.
75. Id. "The prevailing explanation for the existence of international regimes is egoistic
self-interest." Id.
76. Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in
INTERNATIONAL REGWIES, supra note 24, at 115, 132.
77. Id.
78. Burley, supra note 14, at 208; see also William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and
International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227 (1997); John K. Setear,
An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and Inter-
national Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996).
79. CHAYEs & CHAYES, THE NEw SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 2 n.3. "Regime theo-
rists find it hard to say the 'L-word,' but 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making pro-
cedures' are what international law is all about." Id.
80. Michael Byers, Response: Taking the Law Out of International Law: A Critique of
the "Iterative Perspective," 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 201, 201 (1997). Burley, supra note 14, at
220, sees the work of the early regime theorists as a reinvention of "international law in ra-
tional-choice language."
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through the use of "reporting requirements, special non-compliance proce-
dures and measures, liability provisions, and dispute settlement proce-
dures."81
The importance of reporting requirements to the effectiveness of an in-
ternational regulatory arrangement cannot be overemphasized. "Reporting
on compliance, enforcement, and other activities related to environmental
treaties is often described as essential to treaty success."82 Reporting re-
quirements are believed to provide a vehicle for increasing transparency83
and transparency or openness is viewed as the "key to compliance."84 It pro-
vides a means for identifying States who are or are not fulfilling their obliga-
tions, evaluating the rate of compliance, and possibly improving the same. 5
Reporting requirements have come to characterize a number of interna-
tional regulatory regimes including those on environmental protection. 6 In-
ternational agreements on intentional oil pollution have all incorporated
some form of reporting requirements."7 The 1954 International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 8 required states to provide
periodic information to the treaty secretariat on the installation of adequate
reception facilities.89 The 1962 OILPOL convention did away with the peri-
odic reporting requirement and then approved "a non-binding resolution
mandating that the newly established Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization (IMCO) should obtain and publish information 'annually
on the progress being made in providing [tanker reception] facilities.""
However, the 1954 self-reporting requirement regarding available reception
facilities was reintroduced by the 1973 MARPOL
Reporting requirements have also involved external reporting by which
other States report on the non-availability of reception facilities in other
countries.92 This was introduced in oil pollution control regulations at the
1962 conference following a U.S. proposal.93 The object of the proposal was
to shame countries into providing the needed facilities.94 This was to be ac-
81. Conclusions of the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment, Siena, It-
aly, Apr. 21 1990, 1 12(a), reprinted in 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 704, 707 (1990).
82. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 123.
83. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions, supra note 48, at 176-78.
84. CHAYEs & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 154.
85. Id. at 154-55.
86. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 323.
87. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 123.
88. 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 327
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL].
89. Id. art. VIII.
90. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 125 (citing Resolution 6, Inter-governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization, Resolutions Adopted by the International Conference on Preven-
tion of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1962 (London: IMCO, 1962)).
91. MARPOL, supra note 34, art. 11(d).
92. OILPOL 54/62, supra note 88, art. VIII.
93. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 128.
94. Id.
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complished "by establishing a system for tanker captains, through their gov-
ernments, to inform IMCO and other governments of absent or inadequate
facilities non-compliant nations."95 This was replicated in MARPOL.96
States are required not only to report on the availability of reception fa-
cilities for oily wastes, but in the case of Flag States, to report on actions
taken with respect to alleged violations referred to them by Coastal States.'
All States were to provide reports produced in connection with treaty com-
pliance and enforcement." Under MARPOL, parties are also required to
provide an annual statistical report in concordance with requirements of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO)99 concerning penalties actually
imposed for infringement of the Convention."0
Reporting requirements have also been instituted in regional arrange-
ments for marine environmental protection and oil pollution control starting
with the Paris Memorandum of Understanding adopted by some European
countries in 1982. ' Under the Memorandum, member States are to inspect
twenty-five percent of the foreign ships entering their ports and relay the in-
formation regarding these inspections to a centralized computer base on a
daily basis through direct computerized input.'
The level of compliance with all of these reporting requirements has not
met the elaborate provisions mentioned thus far. With the exception of the
Paris MOU system, which has enjoyed a considerable measure of co-
operation by the members as reflected in "regular, high-quality reporting by
all the states involved,"'0 3 compliance with the requirements of the interna-
tional agreements has been less than satisfactory. This is evidenced by the
fact that the number of national reports totals less than twenty per year.'"0 A
Friends of the Earth (FOE) Study in 1992 found that only six contracting
parties had submitted reports for each year since MARPOL took effect, and
more than thirty contracting parties had never submitted a report to IMO.' 5
The other contracting parties had submitted reports, which were often in-
complete, for one or a few years only."0
95. Id. (footnote omitted).
96. MARPOL, supra note 34, Annex 1, ch. II, Reg. 12(5).
97. International Convention (with annexes) for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, 1954, May 12, 1954, 1959 U.N.T.S. 3. supra note 69, art. X(2).
98. Id. art. XII. (icppso)
99. The IMO replaced the Inter-governmental Consultative Maritime Organization
(IMCO) on Mar. 6, 1948. See http://www.imo.org/imo/50ann/index.htm (visited April 15,
2001).
100. MARPOL, supra note 34, art. l1(1)(f).
101. Paris Port State Control MOU, supra note 31. See generally KASOULIDES, PORT
STATE CONTROL, supra note 31, 142-82.
102. Paris Port State Control MOU, supra note 31, § 4.
103. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 137.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 134.
106. Id.
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2001], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol31/iss2/8
2001] INT'L RELATIONS, ECONOMICS, AND COMPLIANCE WITH INT'L LAW 191
One can easily identify at least one major reason for this state of affairs.
The process of reporting (information gathering and dissemination) involves
financial costs and adequately trained personnel hardly available in develop-
ing countries. 7 As a result, developing countries have not been living up to
their obligations and this has affected the overall performance record. Based
on available evidence, there is a nexus between a country's level of devel-
opment and the likelihood that it will report."' It is believed that the "consis-
tent disparity" between the rate of reporting, both numerically and propor-
tionally found among developed countries vis-a-vis their developing
counterparts, supports evidence from treaties on other issues that developing
States often lack adequate financial and administrative capacities and
domestic concern to report."
This underscores the point that States are unlikely to perform their treaty
obligations when the capacity to do so is nonexistent."1 In such a case, a
State would be prepared to place its national interest at the forefront, regard-
less of the consequences that such action might entail. It is self-evident that
in the absence of support, many developing countries will continue to lag
behind in compliance and enforcement. Only a few States have large and so-
phisticated bureaucratic establishments sufficiently equipped to perform the
functions of information collection, processing, and assimilation.' In view
of that, it is imperative for treaty effectiveness and success to seriously con-
sider providing extensive assistance to developing countries in these areas.
Recent trends in treaty-making indicate a realization of the fact that the
process of getting states to implement treaty provisions may involve some
form of assistance to facilitate their action in the desired way. A salient ex-
107. CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 154-57. This does
not rule out other contributing factors such as IMO Secretariat's ineffectiveness in facilitating
reporting. Id. at 155-57.
108. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 137.
109. Id. (citing Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, supra note
21). The absence of domestic concern in developing countries is traceable to the sorry state of
environmental and human rights groups who would serve as a watchdog and thus galvanise
the governments into action. This, in turn, is symptomatic of the species of governance found
in many parts of the developing world-a situation where governments are chronically intol-
erant of opposition. Environmental activists have had experiences ranging from the unpalat-
able to the fatal. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, Nigerian Rulers Back Hanging of 9 Members of Oppo-
sition, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at A9; Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic of
Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TPMEs, Nov. 11, 1995, at 1. These articles discussed a well-
known environmental crusader, leader of the Ogoni people of Nigeria, and Nobel Prize nomi-
nee, Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed in 1995 following a trial, which was hardly satisfac-
tory by civilized standards. Id. The focus here however, will not be on the problems occa-
sioned by the absence of domestic concern, but the implication of the lack of financial and
administrative capacities in relation to implementation and compliance.
110. International policy makers seem not to have grasped this point yet. "The incidence
of reporting requirements is so high that they seem to be included almost pro forma in many
agreements, with little concern about cost or implementing capacity." CHAYES & CHAYES,
Trm NEw SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 154.
111. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 324.
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ample is what has come to be known as "non-compliance procedures." Non-
compliance procedures (NCP), which are instituted as a mechanism for fa-
cilitating compliance in a manner that is essentially unconventional, were
first introduced as an aspect of the 1987 Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer,"' done at Montreal, and has since been replicated in other
international accords'13
The objective of this procedure is to bring about total compliance."4 The
procedure is more interested in how to achieve compliance than being com-
bative, as is typical of a traditional dispute settlement procedure, 5 or in
merely identifying the wrong done and punishing the party responsible." 6
One of the NCP's strong points is that it realizes that non-compliance
might be as much a product of a State's lack of capacity as it might be rooted
in a deliberate or negligent disregard of its obligations."7 A State would thus
be more comfortable with NCPs than with a procedure that castigates it and
"takes it to court" for infractions without considering the possibility that the
State may have desired to perform its obligations, but was legitimately un-
able to do so. Moreover, the knowledge that the cost of compliance is not
placed entirely on its shoulders but that other States would be willing to as-
sist is no doubt a refreshing tonic to any state and a strong attraction to com-
pliance. In that connection, therefore, NCP is a recipe for eliciting States' as-
sent to treaties.
NCP can also facilitate compliance since it creates a congenial atmos-
phere and an environment that fosters cooperation and respect, as opposed to
belligerency and a superior mentality. In such an atmosphere, States can
continue to cooperate in ensuring that the treaty regime works instead of
abandoning negotiation and resorting to less-friendly means at the conclu-
sion of the convention. As some scholars opine, "negotiation does not end
with the conclusion of the treaty, but is a continuous aspect of living under
112. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541, 1550. The procedure was adopted at the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the Mont-
real Protocol in Copenhagen, Denmark, November 23-25, 1992. See Decision IV15, Non-
Compliance Procedure, in Report of the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, Dec. IV/5, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (1992), U.N. Doc. UNEP/OZL. Pro. 4/15 (25 November 1992),
available at http:www/upep.ch/ozone/ 4mop-cph.shtml (last visited April 15, 2001)
[hereinafter Non-Compliance Procedure].
113. See Gunther Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environ-
mental Obligations, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, at 32-3 (1997) [hereinafter Hand], Com-
pliance Control Mechanisms].
114. See Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 112, 9.
115. Hand, Compliance Control Mechanisms, supra note 113, at 34. Traditional Dispute
Settlement procedures are indeed not a realistic option, legally or politically, in dealing with
some issues of non-implementation and non-compliance. However, NCP does not preclude
resort to formal dispute resolution. Id.
116. Id. at 33-35.
117. See, e.g. id. at n.25 (citing Abram Handler Chayes et al., Active Compliance Man-
agement in Environmental Treaties, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
75, 80 (W. Lang ed.,1995)).
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the agreement. ' NCP presents a veritable opportunity to ensure successful
negotiation. It "epitomize[s] an effort at continued consensus building which
may reflect either the (relative) normative weakness of the obligation(s) in
issue or the existence of different levels of normativity within the regime. In
some respects, therefore, NCPs represent a process that straddles traditional
law-making and law-enforcement functions.""' 9 Without necessarily sug-
gesting the replication of the structure of this institutional arrangement per
se, NCP's spirit of cooperation, non-belligerence, and assistance to less ca-
pable parties is strongly recommended for the international policy frame-
work on the protection of the marine environment and prevention and con-
trol of operational discharges by ships.
Building on the observation that the notion of national interest is ubiqui-
tous, regardless of the optics of international relations from which it is
viewed, the next part of this article will discuss the prevailing economic is-
sues. The idea is, that which affects a State's economy obviously raises the
issue of its national interest, and will play a significant part in its attitude to-
ward a particular international arrangement accordingly.
II. ECONOMIC ISSUES
Economists tend to perceive and portray environmental pollution as an
economic problem: "We are going to make little real progress in solving the
problem of pollution until we recognize it for what, primarily, it is: an eco-
nomic problem, which must be understood in economic terms. ' This sec-
tion will examine the contribution that economics can make in solving the
problems of pollution and inefficient management of the oceans. It should be
reiterated, however, that the intention here is not to promote economic mod-
els as alternatives to the extant regulatory scheme in international law. This
work proceeds on the firm conviction that the law as it currently stands can
serve as a useful tool in oil pollution control. What is needed, as this project
has constantly and consistently emphasized, is for States to live up to their
obligations under the law, and to include states that are not yet parties. This
may not be accomplished, however, unless States have an economic motiva-
tion to participate or to jettison whatever benefits they are enjoying under the
present scheme in order to embrace the requirements of a new arrangement.
There is no doubt that this subject raises a number of important eco-
nomic issues. To require States to be involved in the implementation of in-
ternational regulations in relation to pollution by oil tankers is to ask them to
make an economic decision. This involves a choice between environmental
118. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 313.
119. Gunther Handl, Controlling Implementation of and Compliance With International
Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
305, 329 (1994) (citations omitted).
120. Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in MICROECONOMICS:
SELECTED READINGs 498 (Edwin Mansfield, ed. 1975).
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protection and economic development. In the same vein, to demand that
States forego revenue-generating practices that are inimical to the environ-
mental well being of the rest of humanity raises the issue of opportunity cost.
A price is being exacted by reason of that demand and the responsibility for
its payment has to be attached to someone.
Further, if the States that are involved in the foregoing scenario are not
interested in paying the price, other States may be enjoined or compelled to
do so. In these days of global economic downturn, it is an important eco-
nomic decision that should not be considered lightly. This work seeks to
elicit the assistance of economics in fashioning a system that incorporates
the cost of treaty implementation and compliance by States who are unable
to do so. This will be approached under two subsections, namely, interna-
tional economic cooperation and funding.
A. International Economic Cooperation
In virtually every consensual arrangement, which international conven-
tional law clearly represents,' it is almost invariable that any rational being
would hesitate to be involved in that which yields no benefit or which brings
harm. States would therefore continue to have an incentive not to obey the
rules of international law or to refrain from bringing themselves under the
control of any such arrangement.
With respect to a number of environmental issues of international sig-
nificance, developing countries insist that they would not be willing to en-
danger their economies for the common good by refraining from activities
which other nations previously embraced to develop their own economies.'
Narrowing it down to oil pollution by tankers, it is difficult to expect devel-
oping countries to be at the forefront of installing facilities that would pro-
mote cleaner seas in addition to undertaking the inspection of their ships to
ensure maritime safety and environmental protection at their own expense,
or to their detriment. They would no doubt prefer to channel such funds to-
ward their own developmental projects and revisit the issue of environmental
protection decades later, after they have stabilized their economic position.
This should not elicit condemnation though, as a similar posture had
been adopted by the developed world at some point in time in their devel-
opment. An illustration is the reaction several countries had to a reception
facilities provision proposed at the 1954 OILPOL Convention. During ratifi-
cation of the Convention, the United States disagreed with the provision
"because the government did not want to assume 'any financial responsibil-
ity' for building and operating such facilities."'2 Britain ultimately proposed
121. See generally G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNrrY
67 (1993).
122. Jay D. Hair, A Foreword, in TRENDs IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 3
(1992).
123. MrrcHELL, supra note 10, at 191 (citations omitted). In 1961, in the process of rati-
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the deletion of the 1954 Article VIII reception facility requirement alto-
gether, as several States were threatening not to sign because of its inclu-
sion."4 The same position and reasoning illustrated above are arguably avail-
able to developing countries today.
Another example can be found in the case of flags-of-convenience
States.'" The current international legal approach is to make open registries
less attractive,'26 which will invariably rob flags-of-convenience States of
much needed revenue. To expect them to join in such efforts is to urge them
to self-destruct. They would insist on utilizing the practice as a tool for eco-
nomic development. An acceptable regime should embrace their concerns
out of necessity. One solution could be international economic cooperation
measures between the countries of the Northern and Southern hemispheres.
Developed countries should assume the responsibility for assisting their de-
veloping counterparts technically and financially in order to elicit their co-
operation in the crusade against pollution from oil tankers. It would be naive
however, to assume that developed States would jump at this suggestion
without any justification for doing so. Nevertheless, a good basis for the
suggestion exists.
The first flank of that basis is equity. International oil trade is not a new
development but one that has been a longstanding catalyst for the industri-
alization of the countries of the Northern Hemisphere.'27 The nationals of
these countries also control the oil and shipping industries that invariably
contribute to their national economic development. 2 The price the whole
fying OILPOL 1954, the United States entered a reservation stating:
While it will urge port authorities, oil terminals and private constructors to provide
disposal facilities, the United States shall not be obliged to construct, operate, or
maintain shore facilities at places on U.S. coasts or waters where such facilities
may be deemed inadequate, or to assume any financial obligation to assist in such
activities.
CHARLES ODIDI OKIDI, REGIONAL CONTROL OF OCEAN POLLUTION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 33 n. 119 (Shigeru Oda ed. 1978) (quoting 12 U.S.T. 3024).
124. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 191 (construing SONIA ZAIDE PRITCHARD, OIL
POLLUTION CONTROL 128 (1987)).
125. The term "flags of convenience" generally refers to "the flag of any country allow-
ing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under conditions which,
for whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are registering
the vessels." BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STUDY (1962).
126. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience:
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 168 (1996) [hereinafter Ander-
son, The Nationality of Ships].
127. See generally Bill Shaw et al., The Global Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate
Marine Oil Pollution, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157 (1987).
128. See id. "[UNCTAD's] 'Review of Maritime Transport' [(1991)] listed the top three
shipowning nations as Greece (81.97 million dwt), Japan (80.3 million dwt) and the United
States (55.1 million dwt)." Anderson, The Nationality of Ships, supra note 126, at 156-57.
Oil companies, mainly the 'seven majors' based in the United States and the
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world has had to pay for such development however, has been the degrada-
tion of the marine and coastal environment and destruction of the resources
of the commons.'29 Interestingly, the North is currently at the forefront of the
crusade to stem the environmental impact of the international oil business.3 °
The crusade is not necessarily bad. The pertinent question is whether the
battle should be pursued and won at the expense of the economic develop-
ment of the countries on the other side of the world divide, or, the Southern
Hemisphere. It hovers around the equity of the North, which fuels econo-
mies with oil, dictating to the South not only to refrain from doing that
which the North has done and from which it has benefited, but to do so at the
risk of economic stagnation. The interest of the South at this stage is to get to
the level of development that the North has already attained. This may nec-
essarily imply a sidetracking of environmental concerns, including the
international measures on oil pollution from ships. If the North insists that
the environment should be accorded priority or that Southern economic
development should embrace environmental concerns, which is logical,
equity demands that the North should bear much of the expense for that
requirement. As one commentator has correctly pointed out:
[Tjhe debate on the environment has been turned around to try and restrain
developing countries, in the name of the common good, from now doing
all those things which the developed countries did with such abandon in
the past in their efforts to attain their present levels of production and con-
sumption. It is as if a referee has suddenly appeared and decided that all
countries should be deemed to be starting from scratch in the race to save
the environment, no allowance being made for the head start that some
countries had enjoyed and the distance they had already covered.... The
logic therefore.., is that there is hardly room for newcomers, and that the
poor must remain poor in order to save the planet!'
It is also consonant with equity that those who are responsible for dam-
age should remedy that damage. The other side of the coin is that it offends
every notion of fairness to impose a duty on others to redress that which they
United Kingdom, own almost one-third of all tankers and control even more
through subsidiary corporations and long-term chartering arrangements. Independ-
ents, based mainly in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Greece, own the other two-
thirds of the tanker fleet.
MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 109. The nationals of the developed countries also control the
bulk of the shipping fleets in developing countries. Id.
129. David M. Dzidzomu & B. Martin Tsamenyi, Enhancing International Control of
Vessel-Source Oil Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982: A Reassessment, 10
UNIV. TASMANIA L.R. 269, 270 (1991). The authors state that "uninhibited liberty to transport
oil and other goods over the common resource, the oceans," has led to "pollution from ballast-
ing and deballasting, [with] oil spills from collisions and stranding of ships [becoming] a li-
ability to be borne by the international community as a whole." Id.
130. See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 104-06.
131. NASSAU A. ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SouTH DIVIDE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 204-05 (1993).
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did not cause. This parallels the "fault principle," which requires that those
who have damaged the environment should bear the responsibility for the
damage their activities have caused. 32 International oil trade has been under-
taken by, and for, developed countries for many years. This means that envi-
ronmental disasters are attributable to them." These countries should there-
fore, logically be prepared to pay an extra cost for correcting the state of
affairs. It is a time-honored principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that
the person that takes the benefit should also bear the burden. 34
Further support for the proposition that the developed countries should
bear the cost of measures expected of developing countries regarding marine
pollution control can be found in the concept of opportunity cost in econom-
ics and the right to compensation in law. Active participation in international
measures to control or prevent pollution from oil tankers will no doubt affect
developing countries' development aspirations, as they would be required to
divert badly needed funds to these measures and restrict or restructure their
policies to align with the stipulations of international law.135 It follows, there-
fore, that developing countries "could make a plausible argument for the
right to be compensated to the extent that they incur opportunity costs by
foregoing development options to preserve environmental resources that are
of special interest to the world at large."'36 The oceans and the resources in
them are, doubtless, resources that are of special interest to the world com-
munity.'37
A major objection to the points above is the apparent advantage it tends
to confer on developing countries. A number of observers contend that de-
veloping countries simply raise these issues as a smokescreen or cloak to
force the developed countries to pay for cleanup, which is the responsibility
of the developing countries."3 This is an unfair attack. In any case, their con-
132. Phillip M. Saunders, Development Cooperation and Compliance with International
Environmental Law: Past Experience and Future Prospects, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISsuEs: FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE 89, 97 (Thomas J. Schoenbaum
et al. eds.,1998).
133. This is the case in many environmental issues. See, e.g., Gunther Handl, Environ-
mental Protection and Development in Third World Countries: Common Destiny-Common
Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603, 627 (1988) [hereinafter Handl, Environ-
mental Protection and Development].
134. This is encapsulated in the Latin maxim "qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus
et contra."
135. One example is the installation of oily waste reception facilities where it has been
estimated that it would have cost $560 million to install such reception facilities in developing
countries during 1993-2000. See generally United Nations, Preparatory Committee for the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Protection of Oceans, all
Kinds of Seas Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, Coastal Areas and the Protection,
Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.15l/PC/100/Add.21 (1991).
136. Handl, Environmental Protection and Development, supra note 133, at 608.
137. See, e.g., Stephen A. Silard, The Global Environment Facility: A New Development
in International Law and Organization, 28 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 607, 611 (1995).
138. Saunders, supra note 132, at 97.
21
Duruigbo: International Relations, Economic and Compliance with Internation
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
198 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
tention is suspect, as it represents a one-sided observation that questions the
entitlement of developing countries to receive financial assistance without
addressing the broader issue of the need for those who created a wrong to
remedy it. It also fails to consider the fact that there is no moral authority
behind any call to others to abstain from that which you wilfully participated
in and gained from, without providing them with an alternative course of ac-
tion.139 Building an international system founded on notions of equity and
fairness is a better solution for humanity overall.'"
The question of capacity also makes it imperative for developed coun-
tries to assist their developing counterparts in order to expect any meaning-
ful progress in treaty implementation. It cannot be gainsaid that in the ab-
sence of capacity, there is practically little that a country can do vis-a-vis
international treaty requirements.' As discussed in part I, developed coun-
tries have not complied with their responsibility to install reception facilities
or to meet reporting requirements primarily due to their lack of capacity.'
The failure of the richer nations to realize this and address it will continue to
plague any efforts aimed at promoting safer ships and cleaner seas.' 3 Schol-
ars have observed it would be futile to design a strategy to address global
environmental concerns that do not simultaneously "confront the issues of
poverty and economic development, which often seem to make environ-
mental protection a luxury that most nations cannot afford."'" While, "[u]ntil
recently, these tandem concerns have been compartmentalized and consid-
ered separately by agencies and institutions," the emerging consensus is that
the "recognition of the global nature of environmental problems necessarily
entails recognition of the global nature of the problems of poverty and de-
139. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Diversion of Water from the
Meuse case stated: "[T]he Court finds it difficult to admit that the Netherlands are now war-
ranted in complaining of the construction and operation of a lock of which they themselves
set an example in the past." (Neth. v. Belg.) 1937 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/) No. 70, at 25 (June 28).
A pertinent principle here is the maxim exceptio non adimpleti contractus where one party
can plead in its defense that it is entitled to withhold performance where the other party has
not performed its own side of the bargain. In essence, since the person that comes to equity
must come with clean hands, the party in breach is estopped from complaining about the other
party's refusal to perform.
140. On the role of equity in international law, see Thomas M. Franck & Dennis M.
Sughrue, The International Role of Equity-As-Fairness, 81 GEO. L.J. 563 (1993).
141. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions, supra note 48, at 183.
142. CnAYEs & CHAYEs, THE NEw SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 156-57.
143. See W. Jackson Davis, The Need for a New Global Ocean Governance System, in
FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 147 (Jon Van Dyke et. al. eds., 1993). The
writer shares the view that one of the factors an effective ocean governance regime should
incorporate is a "massive allocation of resources during a period of increasing scarcity...
which will inevitably transfer wealth (and therefore power) from the rich countries to the poor
[ones]." Id. at 166. Historically, however, "such a transfer has never taken place peacefully."
Id.
144. Catherine A. O'Neill & Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and the Environment: Trading
Debt and Technology for Nature, 17 COLuM. J. ENVT'L L. 93, 95 (1992).
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velopment."''" Consequently, a formidable challenge confronting interna-
tional cooperative efforts is to put this recognition into practice." There can
be no better way of "putting the recognition into practice" in international oil
pollution control than for developed countries to assume binding obligations
to assist the developing world and thereby facilitate their accession to and
implementation of the numerous international oil pollution control accords.
Developed countries should bear the cost of bringing developing coun-
tries into compliance with the objectives of international agreements, as it is
in their mutual interests to do so. Instead of expecting further profits in fu-
ture sales of pollution control equipment, the focus should be on how to
handle this issue symbiotically, even when it means reduced financial bene-
fit to the developed world. The challenge before the global community in
emphasizing mutual interests in support of global environmental issues at
this time is to recognize the need for a paradigmatic shift. In order to move
into a new day of international relations, it is essential to recognize that "se-
curity is no longer defined by the standoff of mutually assured destruc-
tion." 47 Due recognition should be placed on the fact that the future is
greatly dependent on "securing mutual self-interest[s in order to protect] the
planet's environmental integrity. "
No matter how vigorously marine environmental protection measures
are pursued by some countries, their efforts will amount to little in the ab-
sence of global cooperation. For instance, there is a consensus of opinion
that it is difficult to have a successful and effective oil pollution regime
without the provision of adequate reception facilities in ports.149 In the ab-
sence of these facilities, some tankers will continue to discharge oil into the
seas thereby thwarting the efforts of those countries that have taken the laud-
able step of providing such facilities at their ports. Since oil is ambulatory,
these discharges may eventually reach those countries, mainly in the devel-
oped world, who bear no responsibility for them. In order to protect their
own interest, it behoves them to assist other countries to install such facili-
ties for the benefit of all.
The case of flags-of-convenience shipping that is accompanied by seri-
ous environmental problems is another example."' To safeguard their envi-
145. Id. at 95-96.
146. Id.
147. Hair, supra note 122, at 4.
148. Id.
149. In January [1996], the IMO Facilitation Committee recognized that illegal marine
pollution may occur, in part, because of the high cost or unavailability of reception facilities.
Additionally, the committee noted that many MARPOL states have inadequate reception fa-
cilities and requests IMO members to provide options for financing and operation of such fa-
cilities. See Lindy S. Johnson, Vessel Source Pollution 7 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 150, 151-52
(1996).
150. See generally Ademuni Odeke, Port State Control and UK Law, 28 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 657 (1997); L.F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience-
Does the Present Law Pose Special Liability Issues?, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 63 (1991). See
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ronment, some developed countries, notably Canada, the United States, and
the Paris MOU States, initiated the practice of entrenching a strong Port
State control regime aimed at preventing the entrance of substandard ships
into their territory.' This practice has spread to other parts of the world. 52
The vast majority of open registry states are in the developing world and are
in the habit of registering some of these substandard ships.53 It is expected
that strong Port State control will make open registry less attractive and
eventually eliminate the operation of these ships.
The logic behind the above proposition is, however, flawed as ships
prohibited in the developed world can continue sailing and trading with
other countries with less stringent requirements.'54 The problem, assumed to
have been transferred to such States, could resurface. In the event of mari-
time casualty involving such ships, the effects would necessarily extend
even to States far removed from the accident since the polluting agent, oil,
can quickly spread over a large area. Fish poisoned as a result could be con-
sumed by anyone, anywhere. Other marine resources and areas of interna-
tional significance could also be damaged. Only recently the Global Envi-
ronmental Facility identified such areas in West Africa, a region that is still
prone to tanker pollution, especially from substandard vessels.'55 An actual
experience of the MV Neamt, a ship that sailed from West Africa to South
Africa for forth-eight days in 1997 accurately depicts the situation:
also Sturmey, supra note 46.
151. KASOUL1DES, supra note 31, at 151; see also Craig H. Allen, Federalism in the Era
of International Standards: Federal and State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in
the United States (Part 111), 30J. MAR. L. & CoM. 85, 119-20 (1999).
152. McDorman, supra note 6, at 208-09.
153. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in a 1984 report, iden-
tified five countries, mainly from the developing world, as having major open registry fleets:
the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Liberia, and Panama. See George C. Kasoulides, The 1986
United Nations Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Vessels and the Question of
Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 543, 547 (1989). The table included in Kasoulides'
article provides a list of open registry states from 1930-1986. Id. It is easier for substandard
ships to be registered in flags of convenience States because they operate under extremely
liberal laws. See also Edith A. Wittig, Tanker Fleets and Flags of Convenience: Advantages,
Problems, and Dangers, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 115, 119-21 (1979); Goldie, supra note 150, at 89.
Goldie argues that the registration of ships that might not meet international standards in flags
of convenience states "is an inevitable consequence of tanker economics, [because], [a]s ships
age they tend to become the property of less scrupulous owners, who... make cuts in their
ship's maintenance and so in their environmental protection costs." Id.
154. Anderson, The Nationality of Ships, supra note 126, at 168. "If [a] vessel owner
does not want to correct an infraction and is barred from a port state, it is likely that he may
still trade amongst the developing countries which have fewer resources to conduct port state
inspections." Id (citation omitted).
155. See generally Clara Nwachukwu, Nigeria to benefit from Global Environmental
Project, POST ExPREss, Feb. 11, 1998, available at http://www.postexpresswired.com/postex-
press.nsf/b378f0445ed319398525691a0076c2c6/43f5636dcfc 14c3e852565a70066e7cd?Open
Document (last visited Sept. 10, 1998).
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With no radar, no navigation lights and a useless compass, the crew found
their way to Cape Town by asking passing vessels on their VHF radios
where they were. On the way, the vessel's engines caught fire seven times,
as the pistons have no rings and blowbacks caused small fires throughout
the voyage. Of her three generators, only one worked sporadically. The
Chief Engineer reported that all the carbon dioxide fire-fighting cylinders
were empty and the engine's cooling systems were completely broken
down, as water supply pipes had rusted through from the inside. Inside the
vessel is constantly dark because all the light bulbs have blown, and there
are no spares. The vessel's crew have not been paid for four months, and
there is no food on board. The refrigerators are not working...
One could analogize this issue to crime control. The solution to criminal
activity is not necessarily more jails, for example, but instead in poverty, un-
employment, and lack of opportunity, which is arguably the root of the prob-
lem. It is similarly preferable to solve the problem of ship pollution by dis-
suading open registries from registering such vessels in the first place.
It is expected that open registry States will respond kindly to any meas-
ure that offsets the loss of revenue accruing from the registration of such
vessels, especially if it is one that secures their economies. After all, al-
though the current practice provides a measure of benefit to open registries,
the overall receipts from ship registration has not been shown to signifi-
cantly impact the economies of open registry States.'57 Instead, the major
beneficiaries are the big corporations that engineer the practice.'58 As one
writer observes,
[T]he overall effect of open registries on the economies of developing
countries is negative. Developing countries are unable to compete effec-
tively and cultivate their own shipping industries, and vessel owners take
advantage of the cheaper labor available in those countries.
t 59
The implications of this from an economic standpoint are certainly
enormous. There is no doubt that "'[tihe dependence for carriage of national
trade in foreign flags involve[s] not only a drain on the foreign exchange re-
sources of the country, but vitally affect[s] its ability to compete in trade
freely with all nations of the world, the terms of trade and the costs of the
country's imports and exports.""' It is inconceivable that a State will insist
156. John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure A Sick Industry, 26 GA. J.
INT'L & Cove. L. 571, 589 n.60 (1997) (quoting LLOYD'S LIST AFRICA WEEKLY, May 9,
1997).
157. See generally I.M. Sinan, UNCTAD and Flags of Convenience, 18 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 95, 95 (1984). "The relevance of [flags of convenience on shipping or] open registry fleets
for the developing countries has been only negative." See id.
158. Anderson, The Nationality of Ships, supra note 126, at 159-60.
159. Id. at 161 (citations omitted); see also Sinan, supra note 157, at 107.
160. Anderson, The Nationality of Ships, supra note 126, at 161 n.145 (quoting
NAGENDRA SINGH, MARITIME FLAG AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1978)). But see Gunnar K.
Sletmo and Susanne Holste, Shipping and the Competitive Advantage of Nations: The Role of
International Ship Registers, 20 MAR. POL'Y MGMT. 243 (1993).
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on remaining in such an economic state instead of cooperating in some other
arrangement that has a better likelihood of improving the State. The next
subsection will discuss other ways of raising funds for improving compli-
ance with and implementation of international obligations.
B. Fundraising and Management
The subject of economics is also relevant to the area of raising and man-
aging funds for implementing measures aimed at treaty effectiveness. By
applying sound economic principles of resource management, the oceans
and their embedded resources can be harnessed to provide the needed funds.
One option of funding is the idea of charging some fees for the use of facili-
ties, otherwise known as a 'user pays' system. This paper intends to discuss
that briefly in the following subsection.
1. User Fees
The oceans and the resources within them are enjoyed by a plethora of
enterprises free of charge. A useful economic device for remedying this state
of affairs is the "user pays" principle (UPP)."6 This principle, also known as
resource pricing, is "a well-known and well-accepted economic principle."'62
The UPP aims at ensuring that the user or polluter pays for the full cost of
the resource and its related services.'63 "The idea behind [the UPP] is to in-
ternalize the economic costs of the external effects of production, consump-
tion and disposal.'"
In advocating a user fee for ocean use, the intent here is not to present it
as a pollution control device that could be applied in place of the existing
regulatory scheme, but instead to utilize it as a tool for the generation of
revenue. A "user pays" system is particularly attractive because it is
grounded in equity, as "it is only fair that those who benefit from a good or
service should pay for that benefit."' 6 It is hardly surprising that in today's
world, the idea of paying for the use of common resources is gaining in
popularity as fewer people believe that all services and facilities should be
161. Ferenc Juhasz, Guiding Principles of Sustainable Development in the Developing
Countries, in FAIR PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 33, 39 (Edward Dommen ed.,
1993).
162. Id.
163. Gonzalo Biggs, Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle in Latin America, in
FAIR PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 161, at 93, 107 n.3.
164. Kirit S. Parikh, The Polluter-Pays and User-Pays Principles for Developing Coun-
tries: Merits, Drawbacks and Feasibility, in FAIR PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 161, at 81.
165. Edward Dommen, The Four Principles for Environmental Policy and Sustainable
Development: an Overview, in FAIR PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note
161, at 7, 31.
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free." Where concern exists at all, it has narrowed to the types of services
and facilities for which fees should be levied, and what amount of money
can be fairly charged. 67 "The guiding philosophy emerging in the arena of
public services is that users should pay more than non-users for the services
"1168or facilities they enjoy.
Users may be categorized as either consumptive or amenity users."
Consumptive users are further differentiated as quantity and quality users. 7 '
Amenity users may be active or passive."
[Clonsumptive users may either consume a certain quantity [of water, for
example,] or they may reduce its quality by using its absorption capacity
to dispose waste and by-products ... by discharging effluents into a river.
[On the other hand,] amenity users neither consume nor pollute the water.
[For instance, a]ctive amenity users of a lake may swim or sail [in it while
p]assive users may simply admire its beauty.7 2
The primary focus here is on the consumptive users of the oceans and
the resources contained in them. They include, among others, commercial
fishermen, offshore oil explorers, and companies involved in international
trade who use it as an avenue for transportation.' Considering the utility of
the oceans to this group and the fact that their activities affect the oceans in
some way or the other, it is suggested that they be made to pay a "user fee"
for their use of the oceans. The fee should be "on fish caught, oil extracted,
minerals produced, goods and persons shipped, water desalinated, recreation
enjoyed, waste dumped, pipelines laid, and installations built."'74 Non-
commercial uses such as subsistence fishing and marine scientific research
could be exempt.'
What could be realized from a levy on a small percentage of the profits
of the enterprises currently utilizing the oceans without any charge is amaz-
ing. Available estimates suggest that about two hundred billion pounds of
fish are harvested annually.7 Imposition of a one-half of one percent ocean
166. ROBERT AUKERMAN, USER PAYS FOR RECREATION RESOURCES 31 (1987).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Dommen, supra note 165, at 24.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 24-25.
173. See, e.g., Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full
or Half Empty?, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489 (1994); see also Christopher D. Stone,
Locale and Legitimacy in International Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1279, 1284-88
(1996).
174. ELISABETH MANN BORGESE, OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 90-91
(2d rev. ed. 1996).
175. Id. at 91.
176. Christopher D. Stone, Mending the Seas through a Global Commons Trust Fund, in
FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 171, 176 (Jon M. Van Dyke et al., eds. 1993)
[hereinafter Stone, Mending the Seas].
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use tax would raise $250 million.'77 If the same rate were applied to offshore
oil and gas, it would produce $375 million."" The dumping of more than 200
million metric tons of sewage sludge, industrial waste, and dredged material
are officially reported yearly, as the ocean is, directly and indirectly through
the territorial waters, used as the world's sewer.'79 Taxing such use at only $1
per ton would raise another $200 million."0 Levies could also be imposed for
"several non-polluting uses of common heritage assets, akin to fishing and
oil."' 8' Further, "[c]onsider royalties for the minerals that will someday be
taken from the seabed and fees for the uses of space."'82 Instead of continu-
ing with the current practice of allowing the "first grabbers" to utilize free of
charge, "limited resources such as positions for geosynchronous and earth-
orbiting satellites and frequencies on the radio spectrum," the world com-
munity can sell or lease them. Billions of dollars would at least be realized.'83
The idea of charging for the use of the oceans has existed for years. In
1971, the International Ocean Institute proposed an Ocean Development
Tax, a proposal that was favorably received.'84 Ambassador Castaneda of
Mexico, who later became Mexico's Foreign Minister, "described it as 'an
extremely important, interesting suggestion, and perhaps a very promising
proposal [and added that] [ilf we act intelligently, it has a fair chance of be-
coming a reality in the near future.""'5 Alan Beesley of Canada said:
Lawyers feel they must solve the problems they are facing now. We
must... try to solve problems we are going to face in the future. And if
we think of the problems of the future, this very radical and revolutionary
idea of an ocean development tax is not nearly as futuristic and academic
as it now might seem to be.
18 6
Silviu Brucan, who later played a key role in the anti-communist revolution
in Romania in the late 1980s viewed it as "one of those new daring proposals
that is bound to gain ground in international life because it is based on the
progressive forces at work in world politics and rides the wave of the fu-
ture.
,
"
87
With all of these favorable comments, one would think an ocean tax
would already be in place. The truth is that not everybody is favorably dis-
posed toward such a tax, for a variety of reasons. Proposals by Greece and
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 90-91.
185. Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id. (citation omitted).
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France in 1962 for an international tax on oil imports were rejected.' 8 Some
other attempts, not necessarily limited to ocean matters, have also met with
cold reception and have failed outright.
In 1970, United States President Richard Nixon, while proposing an ex-
tension of coastal States' administration with respect to their adjacent sea-
beds, from the 200-meter isobath to the edge of the continental slope, also
attached a suggestion for a wealth redistribution fund as part of the pack-
age. 89 The proposal was that a percentage of the wealth generated from the
extension would be set aside for the benefit of developing countries,9 ' which
was based on considerations of fairness and as a means of quietening objec-
tions by landlocked States. '
In 1989, the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, proposed a
"Planet Protection Fund." If each nation were to contribute a thousandth of
its gross national product each year, it would amount to $18 billion U.S. dol-
lars per year."9 The fund would have been channelled toward helping devel-
oping countries adopt and develop environmentally friendly technologies at
no cost to them.' This proposal was considered at the Commonwealth
Summit in Malaysia in October 1989 but was opposed by Britain. In its
stead, a resolution was passed at the meeting calling for the strengthening of
existing institutions.'94
The fee proposed here and the fund into which the proceeds would go,
however, present a somewhat different arrangement from some of these
failed efforts. It differs from Nixon's proposal in that "it would look to the
commons both as the principal source and the principal beneficiary of
funds.""'9 Unlike Gandhi's proposal, it does not call for the taxing of States
per se but only those actually using the oceans, whether private persons,
corporate entities, or public establishments. Moreover, even though it con-
siders the developing countries as a beneficiary, it does so only in the sense
of promoting the well being of the commons and the general marine envi-
ronment. It is also different from the Greek and French proposals because it
seeks to universalize the tax instead of restricting it to oil imports. In such a
case, the oil importing States would not consider it a discriminatory measure
but one that is applied to all for the benefit of all. More importantly, it does
not suffer the fate of the others in the sense that they appear to have come
before their time.
188. PRrrCHARD, supra note 124, at 129.
189. Announcement by President Nixon on United States Oceans Policy, May 23, 1970,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 807, 808 (1970).
190. Id.
191. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 179.
192. Ghandi Calls for $18-Billion Fund to Fight Pollution of Atmosphere, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1989, pt. 1, at 8.
193. Id.
194. Britain Stands Pat Against Sanctions, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 1989, at 27.
195. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 179.
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It would be risky to underestimate the degree of opposition that a user
fee may elicit, especially from countries that substantially benefit from the
current practice of free use of ocean resources. A similar and recent pro-
posal, but in deep sea mining, faced opposition as well, especially from
States that had the technology for mining polymetallic nodules of the deep
sea bed and who were not willing to share that technology with anyone else
or utilize the resources for the common good.'96 While acknowledging the
objections that followed the failed "common heritage of humanity" idea
leading to the adoption of an Implementation Agreement by the General As-
sembly on 29 July 1994,' it should be pointed out that we cannot continue
to countenance such brazen displays of egoism by some states.
Of note is the impact the concept of a common heritage proposed in Part
XI of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 has had. It created a landmark in
that it "sets a precedent in international law for the imposition of interna-
tional taxation."'98 The Agreement of 1994'9 has not changed this, although
the terms are varied, thus illustrating that the world is not entirely averse to
the idea of international taxation on the use of common resources for the
benefit of all, especially less endowed countries. The international commu-
nity can now reflect that in more tangible and more refined terms.
With the current state of the global economy, the value of the idea of an
ocean use fee cannot be overemphasized. With nations complaining of the
scarcity of funds and the strain on existing institutions to meet the myriad of
needs confronting the international society,2" it is imperative that we look at
alternative sources of funding. According to one commentator, "[i]f sustain-
able development is not to remain a chimera, new sources of funding must
be mobilized... One of the obvious candidates is international taxation." ''
Law Professor Christopher D. Stone's sentiments reverberates: "Why should
a needy global community give away to the first grabber, rather than sell or
lease at auction, limited resources.... The current practice is a multibillion-
dollar give away."2 ' 2 The global community should continue to use what it
has to get what it wants while striving to preserve what it already has.
The user fee this article proposes will be based on well-defined terms,
such as the tonnage and value of goods transported, or fish and other re-
sources removed, or sewage and other materials dumped. The proceeds will
be channelled into an international fund, which will underwrite such things
196. See generally SAID MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING 119-204
(1987); see also Jonathan 1. Charney, U.S. Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed
Agreement, 88 AM. J. INT'LL. 705 (1994).
197. Louis B. Sohn, International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 696 (1994); see also BORGESE, supra note 174, at 170.
198. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 170.
199. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1309.
200. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 90.
201. Id.
202. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 176.
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as "building and improving ocean services, [for example,] navigational aids,
scientific infrastructure, environmental monitoring, search and rescue, and
disaster relief."' 3 The fund would also finance other measures such as a
global environmental patrol force, with the capability to respond quickly to
environmental disasters like major oil spills, promoting improved enforce-
ment of treaties, and drafting and lobbying for new international agree-
ments.'" The fund would also assume responsibility for "underwrit[ing] ma-
rine research[,] support[ing] forceful monitoring of ocean dumping," and
generally combating pollution on the high seas."W
Furthermore, the fund should "also defer the costs of compliance with
international regulations designed to remedy the ills of the commons." ° In
that connection, the fund will arrange development assistance to developing
countries to enable them to participate in the global efforts for safer ships
and cleaner seas. It is important to stress at this juncture, however, that some
of the activities of the Fund would overlap with measures currently being
undertaken by other international institutions such as the International Mari-
time Organization. This would not result in conflict, as coordination of func-
tions would eliminate overlapping of efforts in certain areas while ensuring
all areas are addressed.
The user pays system has already been successfully utilized as a man-
agement and economic tool in domestic systems with respect to some com-
mon resources that were initially freely enjoyed. An example is the park.2"
There is no cogent reason why this success cannot be replicated in the inter-
national system. The next section will focus on a discussion of the nature
and structure of management of the proceeds of thefee.
2. Funds Management
One approach to dealing with the situation of developing countries in re-
lation to international environmental obligations is the creation of financial
mechanisms,"°m which are created "to oversee and facilitate the flow of funds
related to implementation of an agreement."'  An example of a financial
mechanism is the Montreal Protocol."' The Montreal Protocol includes a
203. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 91.
204. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 175.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. AUKERMAN, supra note 166. Dr. Aukerman conducted an extensive study on the
success of this idea in some countries notably, the United States and Canada. The author also
observes on its use in Western European countries and recommends it for New Zealand.
208. Other methods include common, but differentiated, obligations and international
cooperation measures concentrated on the areas of technology transfer, scientific research and
development and access to benefits of biotechnology research. See Saunders, supra note 132,
at 98-100.
209. Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
210. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 112.
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Multilateral Fund and was established to provide financial and technical co-
operation, and to meet all agreed incremental costs of developing country
parties."' Permanent financial mechanisms are also present in the Biological
Diversity... and Climate Change Conventions.23 Under the latter two
conventions, an institutional arrangement-the Global Environment
Facility-is designated as an interim mechanism for the realization of the
objectives of the conventions.2 4 Additionally, this article proposes that
assistance to developing countries for oil pollution control take the form of a
financial mechanism titled the Global Enforcement Fund. The proposed fund
will operate under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 5
Originally, the GEF was established in 1991 as a pilot project of the
World Bank. 16 Its operation is now governed by an arrangement involving
the World Bank, " the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)Y
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).1 9 The realization
that no single international agency commands all the skills and experience
necessary to implement all the functions of GEF necessitated the tripartite
structure.2 Under this new arrangement, established by representatives from
211. Jason M. Paths, The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol: A Prototype for
Financial Mechanisms in Protecting the Global Environment, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181
(1992).
212. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diver-
sity].
213. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Convention on Climate
Change].
214. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 212, art. 39; Convention on Climate
Change, supra note 213, art. 21.
215. Instrument for the Establishment of Global Environment Facility, 33 I.L.M. 1273,
1273 (1994).
216. Saunders, supra note 132, at 100 n.45.
217. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Dec. 27, 1949, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended by 16 U.S.T.
1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929 (Dec. 16, 1965). "The World Bank is the first and largest multilateral
financial institution." Charles DiLeva, International Environmental Law and Development, 10
GEO. INT'LENVTL. L. REV. 501, 504 (1998).
218. G.A. Res. 2997, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8370
(1972). UNEP is "arguably the world's most important environmental agency." Matthew
Heimer, The UN Environment Programme: Thinking Globally, Retreating Locally, 1 YALE
HuM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 129, 129 (1998). For discussion regarding UNEP, see Karen Tyler
Farr, A New Global Environmental Organization, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 496-507
(2000), and Mark Allan Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment,
20 ENvTL. L. 291 (1990).
219. The UNDP is the central co-ordinating organization for [United Nations] develop-
ment activities and the world's largest multilateral source of technical assistance for sustain-
able human development." Zama Coursen-Neff, Preventive Measures Pertaining to Uncon-
ventional Threats to the Peace Such As Natural and Humanitarian Disasters, 30 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 645, 652 (1998).
220. World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, 30 I.L.M. 1735, 1741, pt. 11(10) (1991) [hereinafter World Bank].
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seventy-three countries at a meeting in Geneva in 1994, GEF was trans-
formed "from an experimental program into a permanent financial mecha-
nism that will provide grants and concessional funds to developing countries
for projects and other activities that protect the global environment.""22
The GEF has a mandate that covers four focal areas, namely climate
change, biological diversity, international waters, and ozone depletion.222 It
perseveres "to assist in the protection of the global environment and promote
environmentally sound and sustainable economic development. ' With re-
gard to the oceans and international river systems, the GEF "is designed to
establish programs [intended] to protect both marine and freshwater envi-
ronments, study and improve deballasting techniques, clean up toxic waste
pollution and upgrade contingency planning for oil spills."2' ' This is intended
as a continuation of the efforts of the signatories to MARPOL 73/78.225
GEF is administered through a division of powers between the compo-
nent institutions.226 In particular, the World Bank assumes responsibility for
administration, trusteeship, and primary implementation of investment pro-
jects.227 It also serves as a repository of the Global Environment Facility
Trust Fund (GEF).228 The World Bank's headquarters in Washington, D.C.
houses the GEF Secretariat, which is in charge of the administration of the
GEF's day to day operations.229
Member States provide the funding for GEF in the form of grants and
co-financing arrangements, though by the Articles of Agreement, GEF ex-
presses a preference for grant funding. 30 GEF funds are primarily utilized for
"incremental costs." These costs are "defined as 'the difference between the
'domestic costs' a country would have to pay to achieve a global environ-
mental benefit and the 'domestic benefit' it would receive as a result.'"231
221. Nicholas Van Praag, Introductory Note to Instrument Establishing the Global Envi-
ronment Facility, 33 I.L.M. 1273 (1994).
222. Instrument for the Establishment of Global Environment Facility, supra note 215, at
1273.
223. Id. at 1281.
224. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions, supra note 8, at 771 nn.55-56. See
also Charles E. DiLeva, The World Bank and Environmental Law: A Post-Rio Summary of
Activities, C883 ALI-ABA 525, 526-28 (Feb. 17, 1994).
225. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions, supra note 8, n.56.
226. Alan S. Miller, The Global Environment Facility and the Search for Financial
Strategies to Foster Sustainable Development, 24 VT. L. REV. 1229, 1234-34 (2000).
227. Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and
International Environmental Assistance, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 42 n.227 (1998). See
also Silard, supra note 137, at 634-35.
228. Silard, supra note 137, at 635. See also Adam A. Walcoff, The Restructured Global
Environment Facility: A Practical Evaluation for Unleashing the Lending Power of GEF, 3
WIDENER L. SyMip. J. 485, 488-89 (Fall, 1998).
229. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions, supra note 8, at 785.
230. World Bank, supra note 220, at 1749-50.
231. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions, supra note 8, at 787 (citations omit-
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GEF therefore does not normally give financial support to projects the host
nations are capable of funding unless compelling reasons can be given to
show that: (1) the particular operation would not proceed without the in-
volvement of GEF; (2) the regular development aid financing mechanisms
were not available; or (3) that GEF funding could provide for additional
global environmental benefits which could not be achieved with existing na-
tional funding."
Under the restructured GEF, funding is also expected from the private
sector. It is submitted that a fee for use of the oceans and the resources con-
tained in them will be a useful way of sourcing funds and ensuring private
sector participation in the global march for environmental security. The pro-
ceeds will be channelled into the proposed fund under GEF and be particu-
larly designated for the projects listed above.
GEF is especially attractive for this assignment because it would facili-
tate implementation and compliance with international law. First, GEF obvi-
ates the need for the creation of new institutions or bureaucracies, which
members of the international community see as money-guzzling and an en-
croachment on sovereign powers. Indeed this vision was the basis of exten-
sive discussions for the restructuring of GEF: "The lengthy negotiations on
restructuring illustrate the determination of governments to avoid the crea-
tion of a new bureaucracy."233 Second, GEF is not just an existing institution,
but is one equipped with the necessary experience and expertise to undertake
the task without additional restructuring." Third, GEF is capable of dis-
charging its responsibilities effectively without any major conflict with the
notion of national sovereignty that has stood as an albatross to the proper
implementation of international rules.23 Thus, without impinging on the sov-
ereignty of States, it nevertheless presents an international oversight mecha-
nism to monitor compliance with environmental treaties, which unfortu-
nately is one of the major pitfalls of the present structure.236 Fourth, GEF is
an enforcement mechanism in itself because of its involvement with the
World Bank. States would want to keep their obligations under the facility to
avoid foreclosing opportunities for future assistance by the Bank, a near in-
evitability in today's world.237 In other words, the concept of enlightened
self-interest will at least compel States to discharge their obligations and act
in an environmentally desirable way. Fifth, and perhaps most significantly,
232. World Bank, supra note 220, at 1742-43.
233. Van Praag, supra note 221, at 1273.
234. Silard, supra note 137, at 645.
235. See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in Interna-
tional Law-Oil Pollution of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 459, 561 (1984).
236. Andrew Watson Samaan, Enforcement of International Environment Treaties: An
Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 261, 267 (1993).
237. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance With Interna-
tional Environmental Agreements-Practical Suggestions in Light of World Bank's Experi-
ence, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 37, 48-50 (1996).
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GEF has a forward-looking posture. The permanent GEF has been described
as an institution intended as more than a channel for project financing. It will
also play a crucial role in supporting "global environmental security by inte-
grating the global environment into national development, encouraging the
transfer of environmentally sound technology and knowledge, and, crucially,
strengthening the capacity of developing countries to play their full part in
protecting the global environment." '238 The revised institutional framework
signifies a change from the "old style assistance" to "new style coopera-
tion. 239
In furtherance of its objectives, GEF recently identified some projects in
West Africa as areas of international significance, and undertook to finance
the preservation of their environmental quality. 21 It is worth re-emphasizing,
therefore, that the marine and coastal resources and environment will be bet-
ter off under a system comprised of a fusion of legal rules supported by an
ocean user fee. The proceeds from such a fee would be managed by the
Global Environment Facility. These proceeds would go toward strengthen-
ing the capacity of developing countries. Such infusion of energy would in
turn enable those states to play their part in global environmental protection
measures.
The responsibility for collecting the proposed fees should also be as-
sumed by the GEF. The sheer vastness of the ocean and the volume of activ-
ity on the ocean, however, pose problems in application. To ensure against
those that will attempt to cheat the system and somehow shirk the responsi-
bility, GEF should align with and seek the support of the various interest
groups that exist in the business. Consider, for example, oil companies oper-
ating shipping lines (International Shippers Association (INSA)) and inde-
pendent tanker owner organizations (International Tanker Owners Associa-
tion (INTERTANKO)); a system could be arranged for the collection of the
proposed fees at the same time as any annual membership fees that might be
due from members. Additionally, it would behove the GEF to establish a re-
lationship with the major maritime States to explore the possibility of col-
lecting the fees at the time of ship registration, renewal of licensing fees or
payment of "tax." Generally, establishing additional offices outside of its se-
cretariat would also assist GEF. This would facilitate revenue collection as
well as any other relevant activities.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Implementation and compliance with international agreements have not
occurred in a desirable manner, as the members of the world community
might desire. Accordingly, this militates against the effectiveness of interna-
238. Van Praag, supra note 221, at 1275.
239. Id.
240. Nwachukwu, supra note 155.
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tional agreements in relation to oil pollution from ships. National interest is
believed to be the source of this state of affairs. Exploitation of this notion is
therefore a sine qua non for the resolution of the problem.
The intent of this article was to go beyond the extant international pol-
icy and legal framework for solving the problem, including the latest effort
of Port State control. Realistically, the oceans, as a global commons, "can
only be protected if the behaviour of the people (i.e. the behaviour of firms,
governments, consumers...) changes."2 ' Authoritative regulations alone
will not effect this change, which requires identifying the reasons behind the
behavior leading to pollution and tackling the problem at the root.
The basic reason identified for the behavior is deference to national in-
terest. Accordingly, this article is meant to advocate capacity-building in
cases of financially incapacitated countries, and introduces alternatives to
environmentally destructive activities. It thus subscribes to the view that
"[e]ffective protection of global commons... is most likely to develop if
capacities for substitution of the polluting activity exist. ,2," In that con-
nection, it strengthens the regulatory structure by promoting the participation
of States that otherwise would be outside the system by encouraging capac-
ity building, which is a prerequisite for such participation.
The concepts of global partnership, international cooperation, and sym-
biosis in international relations catering to the interests of every side of the
world divide must be promoted, as opposed to a system that is partitioned
into winners and losers.
This article is intended to suggest an avenue for the productive use of
resources commonly owned by the international community for the benefit
of all. It also addresses the additional issue of the protection of the oceans
and their resources, as well as remedial actions with regard to damage done
to them. In that light, this article is intended as a voice for the oceans and
marine environment; speaking for them and not just concentrating on pollu-
tion prevention and control for the benefit of States only. It does so by hold-
ing the corporate sector responsible for their actions and demands that they
play a more active and supportive role in international environmental protec-
tion efforts.
Current with recent trends, this article is meant to elicit and enhance
compliance with international law where some States essentially assume an
obligation to defray the cost of compliance expected from other States. This
is especially true when the former are responsible for the current state of af-
fairs or where the latter are not in a financial position to be part of the inter-
national arrangement, as exemplified by the Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer 3 and Climate Change Conventions.'" The current state of af-
241. Volker von Prittwitz, Several Approaches to the Analysis of International Environ-
mental Policy, in MAINTAINING A SATISFACTORY ENVIRONMENT: AN AGENDA FOR
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1, 23 (Nordal Akerman ed., 1990).
242. Id. at 22.
243. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 112.
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fairs regarding oil pollution control must change. It is through new interna-
tional programs as well as reform and enforcement of the current systems
that this change can occur.
244. See Convention on Climate Change, supra note 213.
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